On the eve of the 1996 elections in Bosnia, the architect of the Dayton peace accords, American diplomat Richard Holbrooke, fretted: ““Suppose the election was declared free and fair and those elected are racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]. That is the dilemma.’’ Indeed it is, not just in the former Yugoslavia, but increasingly around the world. Democratically elected regimes are now routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.
For almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy–not just free and fair elections, but also the sanctity of basic liberties, like free speech and assembly, private property and contracts, and the rule of law. But from Peru to the Palestinian Authority, from Slovakia to Sri Lanka, from Pakistan to the Philippines, we can see the rise of illiberal democracy–plenty of elections, but few individual rights.
The pattern is now familiar. It begins right after the (internationally monitored) elections. Popular leaders like Russia’s Boris Yeltsin and Argentina’s Carlos Menem bypass their parliaments and rule by presidential decree. Whatever the point of these edicts–and Yeltsin and Menem are genuine reformers–they make a mockery of the constitutional procedures of government. The Iranian Parliament–elected more freely than most in the Middle East–imposes harsh restrictions on speech, assembly and even dress. In the former Yugoslavia, parts of the former Soviet Union and much of Africa, elections have actually increased ethnic tensions, sometimes leading to war. People in countries without a tradition of assimilation or intergroup harmony tend to vote along racial, religious or ethnic lines.
The tension between elections and individual liberty isn’t new to Americans. What is distinctive about their system is not its democratic nature, but rather how undemocratic it is, since it places many constraints on electoral majorities. The U.S. Supreme Court is composed of nine unelected men and women with life tenure. The U.S. Senate is the most undemocratic upper house in the world (with the exception of Britain’s almost powerless House of Lords): every state sends two senators to Washington regardless of its population, which means that Wyoming’s 481,000 inhabitants have the same voice in the Senate as California’s 31 million. A single senator can hold up almost any bill, which can thwart the will of the majority and bring government to gridlock.
Americans in the democracy business tend to see their own system as an unwieldy contraption that no other country should put up with. One U.S. scholar was recently sent to Kazakhstan to help the new Parliament draft its electoral laws. His counterpart, a senior member of the Parliament, told him: ““We want our Parliament to be just like your Congress.’’ The American expert was horrified, recalling: ““I tried to say something other than the three words that had immediately come screaming into my mind: “No, you don’t!’ ''
In fact, the checks and balances of the American system could be used to ameliorate many of the problems associated with illiberal democracy. The philosophy behind the U.S. Constitution, a fear of accumulated power, is as relevant today as it was in 1789. Kazakhstan, as it happens, would be particularly well served by a strong parliament–like the American Congress–to rein in its highhanded president.
The U.S. government and several nongovernmental organizations are beginning to realize that elections are not an end in themselves. The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. Philanthropist George Soros bankrolls civic groups. Elections look good on television. If a country holds them, the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government, as it has with Yeltsin and Menem. Yet elections are only a process for creating a fair and law-abiding government. They are not, by themselves, what freedom is all about.
A brighter model may lie in some countries of East Asia–Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand–often criticized as sham democracies and one-party dictatorships. It is true that they offer limited (and often rigged) electoral choices, but they provide a better environment for their citizens’ security and happiness than do many of the new ““democracies.’’ After all, economic, civil and religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. And, as in the West, where economic liberty and law came long before mass voting, these countries are evolving into liberal democracies. Call it the spillover effect of freedom.
