In his interview, published Dec. 1, Assad begged the United States to resume Syrian-Israeli negotiations, which broke down in 2000 several weeks before the death of Bashar’s father, President Hafez Assad. Describing what Israel would get in return, Bashar pledged normalization, “like the relations between Syria and the United States.”
Bashar did not suddenly fall in love with Israel. He had a more obvious motive: fending off American pressure. The list of American grievances is long–from assisting Saddam Hussein to aiding postwar terrorism in Iraq, not to mention its long support of Palestinian terrorist groups and the Lebanese Hizbullah. The Syrian Accountability Act, signed recently by President George W. Bush, mandates U.S. sanctions. Following his late father’s example, Bashar tried to walk the surest way to Washington, via Jerusalem.
Syria and Israel talked periodically between 1991 and 2000. The discussions revolved around a simple formula: Israel should withdraw from the Golan Heights, which it captured in 1967, in return for security arrangements and normal relations with Syria and its satellite, Lebanon. Successive U.S. and Israeli governments viewed the Syrian track as a tempting alternative to an emotionally and politically sensitive Palestinian deal. After all, there are no holy places in the Golan. But the Syrians refused any public gesture that might have stirred Israeli public opinion in their favor–and the talks came to nothing.
Since taking office in 2001, Sharon has simply ignored Syria, focusing on the Palestinian conflict. The Israelis mocked Bashar’s immaturity and portrayed him as an anti-Semitic, worthless puppet of his dad’s cronies. Ephraim Halevy, ex-head of the Mossad intelligence agency, spread a story about the young Assad’s addiction to his Sony PlayStation game, and diagnosed “a severe personality problem.” It wasn’t surprising, then, that Sharon shrugged at Bashar’s peace proposal.
But this time Sharon’s indifference might be costly. After overcoming their initial surprise, Israelis have debated whether Assad’s opening is a trick or a true chance to complete the peace ring with neighboring countries. A small “Syrian lobby” emerged among top officials. Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said, “We should not reject a hand extended for peace.” Intelligence chief Gen. Aharon Zeevi-Farkash told the cabinet: “Assad is serious.” Moshe Katzav, the titular president, issued a public invitation for Assad to visit Jerusalem–without authorization from Sharon. At a minimum, those officials argued, Israel should throw the ball back to Assad’s court to test his sincerity.
Only Sharon wasn’t moved. While never saying that Israel should keep the Golan, Sharon issued tough preconditions for “unconditioned negotiations.” Syria was asked to end its support for terrorism and to start the talks from scratch, meaning Israeli withdrawal could not be assumed. Sharon was angry at Katzav’s invitation to Assad, and felt relieved when the Syrians turned it down.
Sharon found support for his stubborn reaction in Washington. In stark contrast to its predecessors, the Bush administration has shown zero interest in the Syrian track. The Americans treated Bashar’s peace endeavor as another act of desperate brinkmanship, proof that pressure can work. Absorbed as he is with Iraq and the coming election, Bush has relegated Arab-Israeli rapprochement to the diplomatic back burner. Given such indifference, no progress can be expected. Which may be a pity: despite lacking his father’s clout, Bashar has shown cleverness and diplomatic skills. Negotiating with him could be a refreshing alternative to the current muddy impasse.
